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We study how the Hurst exponent α depends on the fraction f of the total time t remembered by
non-Markovian random walkers that recall only the distant past. We find that otherwise nonper-
sistent random walkers switch to persistent behavior when inflicted with significant memory loss.
Such memory losses induce the probability density function of the walker’s position to undergo
a transition from Gaussian to non-Gaussian. We interpret these findings of persistence in terms
of a breakdown of self-regulation mechanisms and discuss their possible relevance to some of the
burdensome behavioral and psychological symptoms of Alzheimer’s disease and other dementias.
PACS numbers: 05.40.Fb, 87.19.La, 89.75.Fb
A classic problem in physics concerns normal ver-
sus anomalous diffusion [1, 2, 3, 4]. Fractal analy-
sis [5, 6] of random walks [1, 2, 3, 4] with memory aims
at quantitatively describing the complex phenomenol-
ogy observed in economic [1, 7], sociological [8], ecolog-
ical [9, 10, 11], biological [2, 12], physiological [2, 13]
and physical [2, 3, 4, 6, 14] systems. Markov processes
exhaustively account for random walks with short-range
memory. In contrast, long-range memory typically gives
rise to non-Markovian walks [2, 6, 7, 15, 16, 17, 18]. The
most extreme case of a non-Markovian random walk cor-
responds to a stochastic process with dependence on the
entire history of the system. With the aim of capturing
the essential dynamics of memory loss in complex sys-
tems, we investigate an idealized model for the limiting
case of unbounded memory random walks with depen-
dence on the complete [15] or partial [16] history of a
binary decision process. Persistent random walkers tend
to repeat past behavior, hence a plausible assumption
holds that loss of memory of the past cannot cause per-
sistence but rather can only diminish it. Moreover, all
Markovian and most non-Markovian random walk mod-
els that attempt to account for persistent behavior in-
evitably assume a memory of the recent past, with mem-
ory loss limited to the distant past. Aiming to question
such assumptions, we show here that loss of memory of
the recent rather than of the distant past can actually
induce persistence.
An important global property of random walks, the
Hurst exponent α [17], relates to how persistently the
walkers diffuse. For the case of zero drift velocity, the
Hurst exponent quantifies how the mean squared dis-
placement scales with time t:
〈x2 〉 ∼ t2α . (1)
The dynamics of the random walker can range from sub-
diffusion (α < 1/2), through normal diffusion (α = 1/2)
to superdiffusion (α > 1/2), the latter characterized by
persistence (i.e., long-range correlations) in the random
walk. Persistent random walkers on average repeat past
behavior.
We first describe the case without memory loss [15, 16].
The random walk starts at the origin at time t0 = 0 and
retains memory of its complete history. At each time step
the random walker moves either one step to the right or
left: xt+1 = xt + vt+1 where the velocity vt+1 = ±1 rep-
resents a stochastic noise with two-point autocorrelations
(i.e, memory). The walker can remember the entire his-
tory of prior random walk step directions {vt′} for t
′ ≤ t.
At time t, we randomly choose a previous time 1 ≤ t′ < t
with equal a priori probabilities. We then choose the
current step direction vt based on the value of vt′ in the
following manner:
vt =
{
+vt′ with probability p
−vt′ with probability 1− p
(2)
Without loss of generality we assume that the first step
always goes to the right, i.e. v1 = +1. The position at
time t thus follows xt =
∑t
t′=1
vt′ .
The advantage of this choice of non-Markovian random
walk model stems from its known exact analytical solu-
tion [15]. The probability density function (PDF) evolves
according to a Gaussian propagator with a diffusion con-
stant that depends on time t and p:
P (x, t) =
1√
4pitD(t)
exp
[
−
(
x− 〈x(t) 〉
)2
4tD(t)
]
(3)
D(t, p) =
1
8p− 6
[(
t
t0
)4p−3
− 1
]
. (4)
Asymptotically, the model presents nonpersistent behav-
ior (α = 1/2) for p < 3/4 and a persistence regime
(α = 2p − 1) for p > 3/4 (with marginal persistence
for p = 3/4) [15, 16]. The mean displacement scales as
〈x 〉 ∼ t2p−1, decaying algebraically for p < 1/2 and di-
verging algebraically for p > 1/2. For 1/2 < p < 3/4, the
mean square displacement remains larger than the square
of the mean, such that the behavior remains diffusive, i.e.
nonpersistent. Besides the classification of the second
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FIG. 1: Persistence of the random walk, represented by the
Hurst exponent α as a function of the correlation parameter
p and the fraction f of the total time remembered by non-
Markovian walkers that forget the most recent (1− f)t time
steps, measured over 103 realizations. The dashed line shows
the known analytic result [15, 16] for the case f = 1. The
inset shows the typical plots of 〈 x2 〉 for chosen values of p
and f from which we estimated the α. We find that whereas
values p < 1/2 always preclude persistent behavior in the
f = 1 case, yet persistence arises for sufficiently small f even
for p < 1/2. Note how the f = 0.2 and f = 0.1 curves deviate
away from α = 0.5 as p → 0. We find that this persistence
emerges as a result of log-periodic oscillations (e.g., see the
f = p = 0.1 case in the inset) in the velocity, such that it
changes sign increasingly infrequently. Note also that loss of
recent memories increases persistence for the entire range of
p 6= 1/2.
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FIG. 2: Semilog plot of displacement xt as a function of t
for p = 0.1 and various f. The inset shows xt/t
1/2 versus
time. Significant memory loss (i.e., small f) leads to larger
amplitudes for the log-periodic oscillations.
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FIG. 3: Histogram showing the normalized probability den-
sity function (PDF) of the position of walkers with p = 0.1
after a long time tmax =1638400, for (a) f = 0.8 (nonper-
sistent regime) and (b) f = 0.1 (amnestically induced per-
sistence). We have simulated 103 realizations. Notice the
Gaussian PDF for large f , as expected from the known prop-
erties of the f = 1 case. In contrast, the PDF becomes non-
Gaussian for low f and low p, when memory loss induces
persistence. Indeed, the aforementioned log-periodic velocity
inversions (see text) allow a violation of the necessary condi-
tions for the central limit theorem to hold, thus preventing
the convergence to a Gaussian PDF. The insets show normal
probability plots of the position x versus the normal order
statistic medians m: the linear plot in (a) indicates Gaus-
sian (i.e., normal) behavior, whereas the nonlinearity in (b)
indicates a non-Gaussian PDF. The loss of recent memories
leads to a remarkable change from Gaussian to non-Gaussian
behavior—and consequently to persistence.
moment behavior in terms of nonpersistent (i.e., normal)
versus persistent (i.e., anomalous) diffusion (defined by
the transition at p = 3/4), the first moment scaling al-
lows the classification of the random walkers as either
“reformers” (p < 1/2) that attempt to compensate for
the past behavior, or as “traditionalists” (p > 1/2) that
tend to repeat the past. Crucially, reformers (p < 1/2)
never show persistence (α > 1/2). We next modify the
model in order to introduce loss of memory of the recent
3past.
Consider a random walker that can remember only the
initial fraction ft of the total t time steps. If f = 1
then we recover the full memory model, but for f < 1
the walker, while remaining non-Markovian, nevertheless
does not remember the complete history. We study how
〈x2 〉 scales with t, as a function of p and f . Fig. 1 shows
how the scaling exponent α of the mean square displace-
ment varies as we reduce the range of the memory. As
f → 0 we obtain an unexpected result: even reformers
(p < 1/2) that tend to compensate for past behavior be-
come persistent (α > 1/2). The loss of memory of the
recent past thus appears to cause persistence for values
of p for which the full memory model precludes persis-
tence. In contrast, for loss of recall of the distant rather
than recent past, the persistence can only decrease [16].
How can loss of memory lead to persistence? Note that
for small f and p < 1/2, the random walker attempts to
move opposite to the average direction chosen in the first
ft time steps. It takes t(1 − f)/f additional time steps
for the effect of the action taken at the present time t
to enter into the range of the accessible memory. There-
fore considerable time elapses between inversions of the
time averaged velocity. The behavior thus becomes per-
sistent, because the mean position oscillates with ever
greater amplitude as t → ∞, due to the increasingly in-
frequent velocity inversions. We have found evidence of
log-periodic oscillations, indicating that discrete scale in-
variance, characterized by complex rather than real scal-
ing exponents, plays a role [18]. Fig. 2 shows clear ev-
idence of the existence of these log-periodic oscillations.
The amplitude of these oscillations becomes larger for
small f , whereas for sufficiently large f they effectively
disappear. In the future, we expect to obtain the com-
plete phase diagram separating the persistent and non-
persistent phases as a function of p and f .
We also study a more dramatic loss of memory—the
random walkers’ equivalent of anterograde amnesia: no
new long-term memories can form after a simulated “ac-
cident” or “injury” at time ta. In this case, we find bal-
listic (α = 1) behavior, with no velocity inversions (or
log-periodic oscillations) for any value p 6= 1/2.
We next report evidence that this amnestically induced
persistence for p < 1/2 is associated with a transition
from a Gaussian PDF of the position for f = 1 to a non-
Gaussian PDF for f < 1 (Fig. 3). The inset in Fig. 3
shows a normal probability plot [19] of the position. On
the vertical axis we plot the ordered data, and on the hor-
izontal axis we plot the normal order statistic medians for
the normal (i.e., Gaussian) distribution. Departures from
a linear plot indicate departures from Gaussian statistics.
We obtain a good fit with a Gaussian distribution for
large f but not for small f . One would not typically ex-
pect this result, since only Gaussian PDFs have appeared
in similar models [15, 16]. By changing the parameter f ,
the behavior undergoes a remarkable qualitative change,
from Gaussian to non-Gaussian.
These numerical results are consistent with the known
analytical solutions for f = 1 [15] and for the case of
random walkers with anterograde amnesia, which leads
to a ballistic solution with constant velocity for p 6= 1/2.
Analytic solutions for 0 < f < 1 may require solving
recurrence relations in which the moments 〈xq 〉 at time
t+ 1 depend not only on their values at a previous time
t but also on the values at a time ft in the more distant
past. The full analytical solution for α as a function of f
and p remains an open problem. In this context, we have
found preliminary evidence that the recurrence relations
allow power law and log-periodic solutions in the first
moment 〈xt 〉.
We also discuss the expected behavior for d-
dimensional generalizations for f < 1. For the case of
separate memories for each space direction, we expect the
dimensionality not to play a major role on how α depends
on f . The velocities now become d-dimensional vectors,
as do the displacements. But the velocities along a given
dimension do not affect the position along a distinct di-
mension, thereby effectively decoupling the dimensions,
in accordance with the known analytical result for the
f = 1 model [15].
We briefly comment on the above results, in the
context of complex systems that have learning or self-
regulating mechanisms [20] that preempt repetitive dy-
namics. By incorporating some form of negative feed-
back, many complex adaptive systems avoid persistent or
repetitive behavior. For the full memory model (f = 1),
negative feedback occurs for p < 1/2, so persistence can-
not arise. However, for f < 1 the velocity inversions pro-
voked by the negative feedback happen ever more infre-
quently for the reasons explained earlier, with important
consequences for self-regulation. Essentially, negative
feedback breaks down with the loss of recent recall, thus
allowing persistence. Our results suggest the possibility
of a new quantitative description of the phenomenology
of memory loss and may achieve a closer connection with
realistic applications. Specifically, we note (i) the pos-
sibility of quantifying the extent of memory damage in
diverse (e.g., neurophysiological) non-Markovian systems
via 1− f and (ii) the known relationship between α and
pathology [2, 13] for a number of health conditions.
We do not find it inconceivable that persistence and
repetition in diverse self-regulating complex systems may
emerge whenever memories of recent events degrade
preferentially to those of the distant past. Consider,
for example, the role of memory in health and dis-
ease [21, 22, 23]. A frequent and burdensome behavioral
and psychological symptom of Alzheimer’s disease and
other dementias involves persistent and repetitive behav-
ior [23]. Patients may hum a tune that never seems to run
out of verses, pose the same question dozens of times a
day, or pace the same stretch of floor for hours. They may
also continuously repeat words or phrases (i.e., echolalia).
4Most importantly in the context of our findings, patients
that suffer from persistent and continual repetition of
questions (e.g., the inability to remember directions) of-
ten show clear evidence of loss of recent memory and
immediate recall [23]. Memory loss frequently manifests
itself in early stages of the disease while repetitive ac-
tions are less common in early dementia but increase
in frequency in patients with definite diagnoses of de-
mentia [24, 25]. While memory impairment can clearly
account for repetitive questioning, its role in other repet-
itive actions (either as a cause or as a correlate) has
remained unclear thus far [23]. In view of these facts
and our reported findings, we find it plausible that re-
cent memory loss may bear a causal relationship with
the repetitive behaviors seen in Alzheimer’s disease, in
which memories of the distant past fade last.
In summary, we have discovered a new mechanism un-
derlying trend-reinforcing dynamics: amnestic induction
of persistence. We have shown that loss of memory of
the recent past can cause persistence in otherwise non-
persistent non-Markovian random walkers. Whereas the
loss of distant memories decreases persistence [16], our
results indicate that the loss of recent memories actually
increases persistence, allowing deviations from Gaussian
statistics.
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